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SEARCH AND SEIZURE AS INCIDENT TO ARREST
The doctrine is well established by the great weight of authority
that where a lawful arrest has been made, officers may, as an incident
thereof, without a search warrant, search the person and immediate
premises of the defendant, and seize things connected with the crime
as its fruits, or as the means or instrumentalities by which it was
committed.* To what extent a search of the premises where the ac-
cused is lawfully arrested and seizure of evidence of crime may be
made, is a question upon which there has been considerable confusion,
among the courts and textbooks, largely caused by the application of
broad general rules announced in cases without careful consideration
of the facts to which the general rule is applied.
This problem has acquired new precedent in the recently decided
case of Harris v. United States.' Two valid warrants were issued
for the arrest of George Harris. The first warrant charged him with
a violation of the Mail Fraud Statute of the Federal Criminal Code
in which it was alleged that he sent a letter through the mails in
connection with the execution of a scheme to defraud by negotiating
and cashing a forged check drawn on an oil company in the amount
of $25,000. The second warrant charged that he caused the same
check to be transported in interstate commerce in violation of the
National Stolen Property Act. Five agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, acting under the authority of these two warrants,
went to Harris's apartment in Oklahoma City and there arrested him.
Following the arrest, which took place in the living room of his four-
room apartment, Harris was handcuffed and a systematic ransacking
of the entire place was undertaken. Operating without the benefit
of a search warrant, they made a search which they admitted was
"as thorough as we could make it". The agents stated that the ob-
ject of the search was to find two $10,000 cancelled checks of the
oil company which had been stolen from that company's office and
which were thought to have been used in effecting the forgery. In
addition, the search was said to be for the purpose of locating "any
means that might be used to commit these two crimes, such as burglary
tools, pens, or anything that could be used in a confidence game of
this type." For five hours they literally tore the place apart from top
to bottom, going through all of Harris's clothes and personal be-
*Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1904); Sayers v. U.S. 2F
(2d) 146 (C.C.A. 9th, 1924) ; Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4 (1925) ;
U.S. v. Seltzer, 5 F. (2d) 364 (D.C. Mass., 1925); Furlong v. U.S., 10 F (2d)
492 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); U.S. v. Poller, 43 F. (2d) 911 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930).
167 S. Ct. 1098 (1947).
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longings, looking underneath the carpets, turning the bed upside down,
opening all the chest and bureau drawers, and examining all per-
sonal papers and effects. Nothing was left untouched or unopened.
The agents did not find the cancelled checks which were the object
of their search. Most significant of all, however, was the unexpected
discovery and seizure at the end of his long search, of a sealed en-
velope marked "George Harris, personal papers". This envelope,
which was found in a dresser drawer in the bedroom, beneath some
clothes, contained eleven draft registration certificates and eight notices
of draft classification. Harris was then charged with the unlawful
possession, concealment, and alteration of these certificates and notices.
Nothing was ever developed as to the forged $25,000 check which
was the basis of the defendant's original arrest, and no evidence of
these crimes was found; nor did any prosecution for these crimes
result.
Prior to the trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence on
the grounds that it had been obtained by means of an unreasonable
search and seizure contrary to the provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment2 and that to permit the introduction of that evidence would be
to violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.3
The motion to suppress was denied, and defendant was found guilty
and convicted. He then brought certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
In a five to four decision, the Court held that the search and
seizure was incidental to the arrest and not unreasonable, and that
the draft cards were admissible in the subsequent prosecution for
violation of the Selective Service Act. Its reasoning was that the
entry into defendant's apartment was lawful because the agents had
a warrant of arrest. The ensuing search was lawful because the
agents acted in good faith, and as an incident of a lawful arrest,
the police may search the premises on which the arrest took place
since everything was in the "possession" of the accused and subject
to his control. It was lawful, therefore, for the agents to rummage
the apartment in search for "instruments of the crime". Since the
search was lawful, anything illicit discovered in the course of the
search was lawfully seized. In any event, the seizure was lawful
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." The constitution of every State contains a clause like
that of the Fourth Amendment and often in its precise wording. In Wisconsin,
Art. I, Sec. 11 (1848).
3Insofar as pertinent, the Fifth Amendment provides:
"No person * * * shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness
against himself, * * *."
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because the documents found were property of the United States and
their possession was a continuing crime against the government.
The Harris case thus illustrates the broadest extension of the
scope of search incident to arrest without a search warrant. Its im-
plication may be a serious threat to our traditional freedom under
the Fourth Amendment. ' It was a right protected under the English
Common Law. Historically, this provision sought to guard against
an abuse that more than any other single factor gave rise to American
independence. It will be recalled that the Fourth Amendment was
derived from a similar provision in the first Massachusetts Constitu-
tion. In commenting on this provision, the early Massachusetts court
said.5
"With the fresh recollection of those stirring discussions
(respecting writs of assistance), and of the revolution which
followed them, the article in the Bill of Rights, respecting
searches and seizures, was framed and adopted. This article
does not prohibit all searches and seizures of a man's person,
his papers, and possessions; but such only as are 'unreasonable',
and the foundation of which is 'not previously supported by
oath or affirmation.' The legislature were not deprived of the
power to authorize search warrants for probable causes, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and for the punishment or sup-
pression of any violation of law."
And again in the Olmstead case, Justice Brandeis remarked."
"The makers of our Constitution conferred as against the
government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Along with the desire to protect the innocent, there is the definite
feeling that the preservation of government integrity is an important
factor in the building up of an efficient police system. A government
"of the people" ought to be enforceable without resort to illegal
or underhanded methods. Police officers, however, are schooled to
deal with criminals and undoubtedly, the natural tendancy is for
them to assume that everyone with whom they are forced to deal is
a criminal. The zealousness with which they perform their duties
is subject nevertheless, to the constitutional restraint that all searches
and seizures must be reasonable, and it is the duty of the courts
4 Supra, note 2.
5 Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc., Mass., 329 at 478.6 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 at 478, 48 S. CCt. 564 at 572 (1928), where
justice Brandes applied the prohibition -of the Fourth Amendment to wire-
tapping
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adequately to protect a private individual in this constitutional right.
In a New York case Judge Learned Hand in his opinion stated :7
"The real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the
search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists
in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against
him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make
so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will
ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and
there can be no sound policy in protecting what does. Never-
theless, limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit
the quest itself, and in any case it is something to be assured
that only that can be taken which has been directly used in
perpetrating the crime."
It has been seen that a search may be unreasonable though con-
ducted under the authority of a search warrant because in the execu-
tion of such warrant officers are authorized to seize only the particular
articles described and no discretion is left to the officer as to what
is to be taken." Since a judicially-issued warrant is the primary pro-
tection against a general search or a search without probable cause,
it should follow than an officer should have at least as much grounds
for searching without a warrant as would be necessary to procure
the warrant. However, the one exception to this rule is a search
as made incident to a lawful arrest. Thus the extent of such a search
is obviously greater than under a search warrant in that mere evi-
dence may be seized; evidence, that is, which does not come under
the classification of stolen or embezzled goods, goods used as the means
of committing a felony, or goods possessed with intent to uise them
to commit a felony. The reasons generally advanced in the cases for
this extension of the right of search and seizure, if any, are the great
necessity for the prosecution of criminal justice? and the fact that
it has always been done. Although the latter may not appear to be
very forceful at first, nevertheless, people are not apt to protest as
unreasonable a thing which they have acquiesced in for many years.
A further justification may be that since such searches are always
limited to lawful arrests, the chances of an innocent person's privacy
being infringed upon are reduced to a minimum. It should be noted,
then, that many searches and seizures may be legalized by an arrest,
7 U.S. v. Poller, 43 F. (2d) 911 at 914 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930).
8 U.S. v. Snyder, 278 F. 650 (D.C., W.Va., 1922) ; Jokosh v. State, 181 Wis. 160
(1923) ; Hessian v. State. 196 Wis. 435 (1928) ; O'Leary v. State, 196 Wis. 442(1928); Paper v. U.S., 53 F. (2d) 184 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931); as to search and
seizure in Wisconsin generally, see Dax and Tibbs, "Arrest, Search and
Seizure" (1946) ; see further Fraenkel, "Concerning Search and Seizurei" 34
Harv. L. Rev. (1921); 13 Minn. L. Rev. (1928).
9. Spalding v: Preston, 21 Vt. 9 (1848); Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. CtC.
341 (1914) ; People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923) ; State v.
Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 S.E. 514 (1923) ; 4 Am. Jur. 47; 25 Jrnl. Crim. Law
282 (1934).
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though they would be illegal if a search warrant alone were relied
upon.
The right of search of the person incident to a lawful arrest,
without warrant was liberally recognized at common law. This was
sanctioned for the purposes of safety of the custody, and incarcera-
tion of the defendant as well as ascertaining the presence of weapons
or implements of escape. 10
Following the enactment of the Federal Prohibition Law in 1919,
due in part to the practical difficulties attending the enforcement not
only of this but of other criminal laws under present conditions of
quick communications and movement, the tendancy has been to extend
rather liberally the right of search and seizure incident to arrest.
These searches have been justified on the ground that difficulties would
attend the enforcement of laws if a search warrant were required
since the goods might be removed beyond the jurisdiction during the
time required to obtain the warrant." In Milan v. United States,12
federal officers had reasonable grounds for believing that a certain
truck was being used for illegal transportation of liquor. They stopped
the truck and started to search it, but instead of liquor they found
Chinamen being illegally imported into the country. The seizure of
the Chinamen was held proper.
The seizure of one's private papers, though, was more restricted
at English Common Law. In an old English case,13 Lord Camden
declared that one's papers are his dearest property, showed that the
law of England did not authorize a search of private papers to help
forward conviction even in cases of the most atrocious crime and
said :1
"Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law
towards criminals or from a consideration that such a power
would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the
public, I will not say. It is very certain, that the law obligeth
no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of
compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as
the guilty, would be cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that
search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle.
There too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty."
10 Thornton v. State, 117 Wis. 338 (1903) ; Getchell v. Paige, 103 Me. 387, 69 A.
624 (1908) ; 147 Am. Jur. 515, note 13.
11 These cases involved searches of automobiles: Carrol v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132,
45 S. Ct. 280 (1925) ; Wilder v. Miller, 190 Wis. 136 (1926) ; Husty v. U.S.,
282 U.S. 694, 51 S. Ct. 240 (1931) ; State v. Leadbetter, 210 Wis. 327 (1933);
Gray v. State, 343 Wis. 57 (1943).
12296 F. 629 (C.C.A. 4th, 1924); In Gray v. State, supra, note 11, defendants
were arrested for vagrancy and subsequent search of automobile revealed
stolen property. Its seizure was held proper as an incident of the arrest. See
also U.S. v. Jankowski, 28 F. (2d) 800 (C.C.A. 2d, 1928) ; Matthews v. Correa,
135 F (2d) 534 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
"3Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
14 Ibid., at 1032.
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This same restriction was, also, applicable to private dwelling
houses. Lord Chatham's eloquent words probably speak as well for
persons now as then in recognizing that a man's home is still his
castle in some respects :15
"Every man's house is called his castle. Why? Because it
is surrounded by a moat, or defended by a wall? No, the
poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all forces of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."
This restriction was relaxed in the United States, and in the Gouled
case,:" the Court ruled a valid search may result in the seizure of
papers as well as other kinds of property; the test being not the nature
of the property seized, but whether such property was used by the
accused in perpetrating the crime. The decision was supported by
the following language of the Court :17
"There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from
other forms of property, to render them immune from search
and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles
of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if
they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant. Stolen
or forged papers have been so seized - and lottery tickets -
and we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as in in-
struments or agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the govern-
ment as to give the public an interest in them which would
justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly
issued search warrant for the purpose of preventing further
frauds."
Again in Kirschenblatt v. United States,"' the court while recog-
nizing that papers or documents found in the possession of the party
lawfully arrested are not immune from the application of the prin-
ciples herein considered, and may in a proper case be seized as an
incident of the lawful arrest, yet denied the doctrine that the right
of search of premises gives as broad a right to seize articles which
are not the tools or fruits of the crime, such as documents, as when
these articles are found on the person so arrested. In other words,
the court supported the view that there may be a right to seize ar-
ticles found on the person of the party arrested, as an incident of
the arrest, where no such right would exist if the articles were found
on the premises of the one arrested, even though it is admitted that
25Address to Parliament 1766, quoted in 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., at 611 (1927 and in Flagg v. U.S., 233 F. 481 at 482 (C.C.A. 2d, 1916).
26 Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261 (1921).
17 Ibid., at 309.
18 16 F (2d) 202 (C.C.A. 2d, 1926).
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the immediate premises may be searched as an incident of the arrest..
This is plain from the classical language of Judge Learned Hand. 9
"After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will
among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, ap-
pears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be done
under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more
protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate.
True, by hypothesis the power would not exist, if the supposed
offender were not found on the premsits; but it is small con-
solation to know that one's papers are safe only so long as one
is not at home. Such constitutional limitations arise from griev-
ances, real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and
should go pari passu with the supposed evil. They withstand
the winds of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots
in the past. Nor should we forget that what seems fair enough
against a squalid huckster of bad liquor may take on a very
different face, if used by a government determined to suppress
political opposition under the guise of sedition."
It is thus apparent that a lawful arrest is not a carte blanche to
make a general exploratory search, since a "fishing expedition" with-
out some grounds for believing evidence is per se unreasonable.
Illustrative of this are the strict limtiations the Court has placed
upon searches and seizures without a warrant, in connection with a
lawful arrest, in the past.20
In the Marron case,2 ' officers executing a valid search warrant
for intoxicating liquor found and arrested one Birdsall who in pur-
suance of a conspiracy was actually engaged in running a saloon. As
an incident to the arrest they seized a ledger in a closet where the
liquor or some of it was kept and some bills beside the cash register.
These things were visible and accessible and in the offender's imme-
diate custody. There was no threat of force or general search or
rummaging the place. The Court held their seizure proper as an inci-
dent to the arrest.
The Marron case was misunderstood and was later distinguished
in the Go-Bart case.2 There, prohibition agents entered the office
of a company, placed under lawful arrest two of its officers on a
charge of conspiracy to sell intoxicating liquors, and made a general
search of the premises. They compelled by threats of force the open-
ing of a desk and safe, and seized therefrom and from other parts
of the office, papers and records belonging to the company and its
officers. The Court, in assuming that the facts of which the arresting
:1 Ibid., at 203.20 Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
U.S., 282 U.S. 344, 51 St. Ct. 153 (1931); U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52
S. Ct. 420 (1932).
21 Supra, note 20.
22 Supra, note 20.
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officers had been previously informed were sufficient to justify the
arrests without a warrant, nevertheless, held that the search of the
premises was unreasonable. In distinguishing this case from the
Marron case, it pointed out that the articles seized in the latter case
were in plain view, no search or rummaging was made for them,
and when the arrest was made the ledger and bills were in use to
carry on the criminal enterprise.
The Go-Bart case has been the leading case and has been fol-
lowed in subsequent decisions.2 in the Lefkowitz case,2 4 the defend-
ants were charged with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act and as a part of the conspiracy, they were using a designated
room in soliciting orders for liuor. Under a warrant of arrest issued
upon the complaint, the defendants were arrested in the room desig-
nated. The officers explored all desks, cabinets, and waste baskets
for evidence of guilt, and found various books, papers, and other
things intended to be used in soliciting orders for liquor. In holding
the search unreasonable as an incident of the arrest, justice Butler's
conclusion was :25
"The right of personal security, liberty, and private property
is violated if the search is general, for nothing specific but for
whatever the containers may hide from view, and is based
only on the eagerness of officers to get hold of whatever evi-
dence they may be able to bring to light. Such a search and
seizure as these officers indulged themselves in is not like that
in Marron v. U.S. where things openly displayed to view were
picked up by the officers and taken away at the time an arrest
was made. The decision that does control is the Go-Bart case."
"* * * The whole point about the Fourth Amendment is
that its protection extends to offenders as well as to the law
abiding, because of its important bearing in maintaining a free
society and avoiding the danges of a police state. The authority
of officers to search one's house or place of business contempo-
raneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant
of arrest cetarinly is not greater than that conferred by a search
warrant issued upon adequate proof and sufficiently describing
the premises and the things sought to be obtained. Indeed, the
informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates em-
powered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures
are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over
the hurried actions of officers and others who may happen to
make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely
to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance
23 U.S. v. 1,013 Crates of Empty O.S. Whiskey Bottles, 52 F. (2d) 49 (C.C.A. 2d,
1931) ; U.S. v. Lefkowitz, supra, note 20; Bushouse v. U.S., 67 F (2d) 843 (C.
C.A. 6th, 1933); U.S. v. Brengle, 29 F. Supp. 190 (D.C., 1939); U.S. v.
Thompson, 113 F. (2d) 643 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
24 Supra, note 20.
25 Ibid., at 462 and 464.
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upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting
under the excitement that attends the capture of persons ac-
cused of crime."
The result of these decisions is apparently that while officers in
making a lawful arrest, may as an incident thereof, without a search
warrant, make a valid search of the premises immediately under
the possession and control of the person arrested and seize such
articles as are used by him in carrying on the criminal offense
charged, or useful for that purpose, they may not make a general
exploratory search as an incident of the arrest, and seize private
papers which are of value only as evidence of the crime. It should,
also, be noted that where articles are visibly accessible or openly
displayed to view, so no exploration or rummaging is necessary to
seize them, such seizure will not be unreasonable.2 6
Throughout all of the cases involving these situations there are
certain factors of policy which appear to control the courts in de-
termining the reasonableness of a search and seizure without a
warrant:
(1) The extent of the privacy which is invaded, measured by
the natural feeling of an innocent individual. This should
always be a major consideration in any case. Opposed to
this is the necessity for seizing the goods. Goods pos-
sessed with the intent to use them to commit a crime must
be seized to protect the public.
(2) The practicability of getting a warrant before seizing the
property. This factor is particularly exhibited in those
cases dealing with the right to search an automobile.
(3) The manner of the search.
(4) The probable cause for believing that the search would
show property that might be seized.
In the instant Harris case, Justice Frankfurter saw the implica-
tions of such an extensive application of the general doctrine, when
he stated in his vigorous dissent :2
"No doubt the Fourth Amendment limits the freedom of
the police in bringing criminals to justice. But to allow them
the freedom which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
curb was deemed too costly by the Founders. As Mr. Justice
Holmes said in the Olmstead case, "we must consider the two
objects of desire both of which we cannot have, and make up
our minds which to choose." Of course arresting officers
generally feel irked by what to them are technical legal re-
strictions. But they must not be allowed to be unmindful of
the fact that such restrictions are essential safeguards of a free
people. To sanction conduct such as this case reveals is to
26 Italics the writer's.
27 Supra, note 1, at 1112.
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encourage police intrusions upon privacy, without legal war-
rant, in situations that go even beyond the facts of the pres-
ent case if it be said that an attempt to extend the present
case cay be curbed in subsequent litigation, it is important
to remember that police conduct is not often subjected to
judicial scrutiny. Day by day mischief may be done and pre-
cedents built up in practice long before the judiciary has an
opportunity to intervene. It is for this reason - the dangerous
tendency of allowing encroachments on the rights of privacy
- that this Court gave to the Fourth Amendment its wide
protective scope."
Thus the attendant dangers of the Harris case plainly appear.
In the light of this decision a man's home is his castle only if he
is not at home. The Fourth Amendment is no longer a bar to tyranny
and oppression. The stringent requirements of a search warrant
are now dead letters as to those arrested in their homes. In circum-
venting the traditional protection of individual privacy, the authority
of the Harris case is now an invitation to fishing expeditions. As
Judge Learned Hand recently remarked :28
"If the prosecution of crime is to be conducted with so
little regard for that protection which centuries of English law
have given to the individual, we are indeed at the dawn of a
new era; and much that we have deemed vital to our liberties,
is a delusion."
For these reasons, it is submitted that the Harris doctrine is un-
sound and search and seizure on premises incident to arrest should be
limited to the following conditions:
(1) When such search and seizure is within the category of
mere incidents of the arrest for the purpose of securing
the safety of the officers, as when concealed weapons
may be possessed, or for getting the subject-matter or
evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been
made and
(2) when such search and seizure does not involve unneces-
sary ransacking or rummaging so as to be mere explora-
tory searches for evidence of crime in general, on the
theory that they are incidental to a lawful arrest.
NORMAN L. SCHATZ
28 U.S. v. DiRe, 159 F. (2d) 818 at 820 (1946).
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